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 1  Introduction
* 
For decades, many countries around the world have used active labor market policies to im-
prove the labor market outcomes of the unemployed. Training programs are considered as 
most important components of this policy. They should increase the employability of the un-
employed by adjusting their human capital to the demand in the labor market. 
The evaluation of these rather costly programs has been the focus of a large substantive and 
methodological literature in economics (e.g., see Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins, 1997, 
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999, Kluve, 2006, and Martin and Grubb, 2001, for over-
views). However, this literature could not measure the effects on human capital because it has 
almost exclusively studied the effects on employment and realized earnings or realized wages 
(setting wages or earnings to zero). Analyzing the realized wage or earnings distributions with 
and without training participation reveals only a crude measure of how much productivity the 
training program added. Expected realized earnings are the product of the individual earnings 
capacity or earnings potential times the probability to take up employment. Therefore, they 
are influenced by labor demand and labor supply and thus hard to interpret in terms of human 
capital and earnings capacity that are key policy parameters in relation to such programs. 
Since such training programs are typically targeted at populations with rather low employ-
ment probabilities, it is not surprising that most differences in realized earnings and wages 
uncovered by evaluation studies are driven by differences in the employment rates and not by 
changes in potential earnings. 
                                                           
*  The first author has further affiliations with ZEW, Mannheim, CEPR, London, IZA, Bonn, PSI, London, and 
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Bender, Annette Bergemann, Bernd Fitzenberger, Ruth Miquel, Stefan Speckesser, and Conny Wunsch to 
make the administrative data accessible for research. We thank Josh Angrist for helpful comments on a 
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Furthermore, the earnings capacity reflects substantive and long-lasting improvements of la-
bor market prospects. In contrast to realized earnings, they are much less dependent on fluc-
tuations in labor demand and supply. Moreover, such gains are not subject to the so-called 
lock-in effect that is found in many empirical studies.
1 Typically, it takes some time before the 
employment  effects  stabilize  to  the  long-term  equilibrium  (e.g.  see  Lechner,  Miquel,  and 
Wunsch, 2005). Therefore, analyzing earnings capacity instead of realized earnings has the 
additional advantage of allowing uncovering the long-run earnings effects before the em-
ployment effects reach their long-run level. Because programs are changed frequently in the 
field of active labor market policy, policy advice depends crucially on impact estimates of 
recent versions of the programs. For many policy questions, it is therefore more interesting to 
understand the differences in the distribution of earnings, under the presumption that partici-
pants and non-participants would have found a job. We analyze this effect in this paper. 
Evaluating the effect of a training program on earnings capacity is, however, a complicated 
econometric problem because of the selective observability of earnings. Participants in train-
ing programs are typically low skilled unemployed with 'bad' employment histories and low 
reemployment rates. Therefore, if we are interested in the earnings effects of such programs 
we have to deal with the fact that many participants as well as comparable non-participants 
will not receive any earnings since they did not take-up employment in the first place. To 
complicate the issue further, we expect that those individuals who take-up jobs are not ran-
domly selected. Instead, on average those unemployed have lower reservation wages given 
their productivity as observed by their employer. If minimum wage arguments are relevant, 
then this level of productivity per se plays an additional role. 
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Evaluating the earnings capacity effects of training programs is thus not straightforward. A 
convenient, but generally incorrect, approach is to compare the earnings for both employed 
groups (participants and non-participants). An alternative popular strategy is to use sample 
selection models (Heckman, 1979). The identification of such models either requires a distri-
butional assumption or relies on an instrument that determines the employment status but 
does not affect earnings. Finding such a variable, however, is usually difficult and impossible 
in our application. 
We follow, therefore, another strategy: We derive bounds on the average and quantile pro-
gram effects on earnings capacity for specific observable populations. After having derived 
the so-called worst-case bounds that are usually very wide, we consider how these bounds can 
be tightened by making further economically motivated, but rather weak behavioural assump-
tions that will be plausible in many applications. It is an advantage of the bounds suggested 
that they do not depend on the way the selection problem relating to program participation is 
controlled for: by a randomized experiment, by matching, or by instrumental variables. In our 
particular application, we use a matching strategy that is reasonable given the informative 
administrative database available. 
We also propose consistent, nonparametric estimators for all bounds and apply them to the 
evaluation of training programs in West Germany.
2 Active labor market policy is an important 
(and expensive) tool of the German labor market policy in general. Germany offers several 
types of training programs, which allows the differentiation of the effects according to pro-
gram types. Such differentiation is very important for policy advice. Finally, our administra-
tive data contain detailed information usually not available in other studies that allow us to 
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control for selectivity into program participation and to capture credibly important aspects of 
the effect heterogeneity. 
This  paper  builds  on the  existing  literature  on  partial identification.  Manski  (1989,  1990, 
1994, and 2003) contributes very prominently to this approach consisting in bounding the 
effects of interest using only weak assumptions. Blundell, Ichimura, Gosling, and Meghir 
(2007) introduce a restriction imposing positive selection into work, while Lee (2005) uses an 
assumption restricting the heterogeneity of the program effects on employment. We consider 
variants of these assumptions and show that they allow tightening the bounds on the treatment 
effects. Zhang and Rubin (2003) and Zhang, Rubin, and Mealli (2007) combine these two 
types of assumption. Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) use a similar combination of as-
sumptions to bound the effects of school vouchers on test scores.
3 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, we bound the treatment 
effects for an observed population consisting of the employed participants. Most of the exist-
ing literature bounds the effects for the unobserved population of individuals who would work 
irrespective whether they participate in a program or not. However, results for an unobserved 
population are less intuitive and more difficult to communicate. Such a population cannot be 
characterized, for example, by simple descriptive statistics. 
Secondly, we bound not only average but also quantile treatment effects. The effects of a 
treatment on the distribution of the outcome are of fundamental interest in many areas of em-
pirical research. The policy-maker might be interested in the effects of the program on the 
dispersion of the outcome, or its effect on the lower tail of the outcome distribution. Interest-
ingly, the distribution is easier to bound than the mean when we do not point identify the ef-
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fects. For instance, bounds on the support of the outcome variable are required to bound the 
mean but not the quantiles of a random variable in presence of missing observations. 
The third contribution of this paper is to allow a more general first step selection process. All 
the existing papers bounding the treatment effects have assumed that the treatment status was 
randomly determined. While this simplifies the derivation of the results, it does not corre-
spond to the majority of the potential applications and therefore reduces the interest in these 
methods. In our application, we assume that the treatment status is independent of the out-
come variables only conditionally on a set of covariates. To implement our theoretical results 
we propose new estimators allowing for both continuous and discrete control variables. 
Finally, we propose a new, policy relevant application of all our theoretical results. Using our 
preferred combination of assumptions, we find substantial increases in the earnings capacity 
for three of the four program groups we consider. In fact, both average treatment effects and 
most quantile treatment effects significantly exclude a zero potential earnings effect of these 
three programs. This shows that our bounding strategy is not only credible because it makes 
weak assumptions, but that this strategy can be very informative for policy makers as well. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives some institutional details 
about training programs in Germany and discusses data issues. In Section 3, we define the 
notation and the treatment effects of interest. We also present a unifying framework for ana-
lyzing average and quantile treatment effects. Section 4 contains the identification results. 
Section 5 proposes nonparametric estimators for the bounds derived in Section 4. Section 6 
presents the empirical results and Section 7 concludes. The proofs of the various lemmas and 
theorems are relegated to an appendix that can be downloaded from the web pages of the au-
thors at www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/earnings. Lechner and Melly, 2007  5 
2  Training programs in Germany 
2.1  Active and passive labor market policy 
Germany belongs to the OECD countries with the highest expenditure on labor market train-
ing measured as a percentage of GDP after Denmark and the Netherlands, and it makes up the 
largest fraction of total expenditure on active labor market policies.
4 Table 1 displays the 
expenditures for active and passive labor market policies and especially for training programs 
in West Germany for the years 1991-2003. Training has the objective of updating and in-
creasing the human capital of those workers who became unemployed. It is the most utilized 
instrument and represents almost 50% of the total expenditure devoted to the active labor 
market policy. 
Table 1: Passive and active labor market policies in West Germany 1991-2003 
  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003 
Total expenditure in billion EUR  25  35  39  43  42  41  48 
Shares of total expenditure in % of               
  Passive labor market policy  72  76  80  83  80  77  82 
  Active labor market policy  28  24  20  17  20  23  18 
  Training programs  13  10  10  8  10  11  7 
Unemployment rate in %  6.2  8.0  9.1  10.8  9.6  8.0  9.3 
Source: Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005). 
In Germany, labor market training consists of heterogeneous instruments that differ in the 
form and in the intensity of the human capital investment, as well as in their duration. We 
aggregate the different programs into four groups according to their selection of participants, 
educational content, and organization. Practice firms simulate working in a specific field of 
profession. Their mean duration is 6 months in our sample.
5 Short training comprises courses 
that provide a general adjustment of working skills. Their mean duration is 4 months and does 
not exceed 6 months. Long training is similar to short training but with a duration of more 
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than 6 months and a mean duration of 11 months. Re-training courses enable working in a 
different profession than the one currently held by awarding new vocational degrees. Their 
mean duration is 20 months. 
2.2  Data and definition of the sample 
We use a database obtained by merging administrative data from three different sources: the 
IAB employment subsample, the benefit payment register, and the training participant data. 
This is the most comprehensive database in Germany with respect to training conducted prior 
to 1998. We reconstruct the individual employment histories from 1975 to 1997. It also con-
tains detailed personal, regional, employer, and earnings information. Thus, it allows control-
ling for many, if not all, important factors that determine selection into programs and labor 
market outcomes. Moreover, precise measurements of the interesting outcome variables are 
available up to 2002. 
We  consider  program  participation  between  1993  and  1994.  A  person  is  included  in  our 
population of interest if he starts an unemployment spell between 1993 and 1994. The group 
of participants consists of all persons entering a program between the beginning of this unem-
ployment spell and the end of 1994. We require that all individuals were employed at least 
once and that they received unemployment benefits or assistance before the start of the pro-
gram. Finally, we impose an age restriction (25-55 years) and exclude trainees, home workers, 
apprentices and part-time workers. The resulting sample comprises about 9000 participants 
and about 270 to 550 participants in the 4 programs.
6 
Our outcome variables are annual employment and earnings during the seventh year after 
program start. This allows us to concentrate on the long-run effects, which are more interest-
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ing policy parameters than the short-term effects, because the former are closer to the perma-
nent effects of the program. Particularly for longer programs, the short-run effects are much 
influenced by the so-called lock-in effects (Van Ours, 2004), meaning that unemployed re-
duce their job search activities while being in the program. 
2.3  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for selected socio-economic variables in the sub-samples 
defined by treatment and employment (employed / non-employed) status. This illustrates the 
'double selection problem' for the estimation of program effects on earnings. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of selected variables by treatment and employment status 
  Non-
participation  Practice firm  Short 
training 
Long 
training  Re-training 
  E  NE  E  NE  E  NE  E  NE  E  NE 
Number of observations  3211  5717  127  139  297  264  169  155  254  153 
Monthly earnings (EUR)  1561  1462  1636  1548  1757  1656  1942  1669  1637  1519 
Age            (years)  34  39  35  36  34  36  34  36  30  31 
Women         (share in %)  38  44  40  29  36  40  40  39  38  37 
German  83  81  88  86  93  88  91  94  90  88 
Big city  25  27  17  20  22  25  24  34  19  22 
Education: no degree  21  27  20  17  13  17  8  10  22  27 
University degree   6  5  0  0  6  6  17  10  3  3 
Salaried worker  30  28  35  32  40  37  63  52  25  20 
Unskilled worker  37  41  34  39  26  36  15  25  51  54 
Note:   Means for the earnings variable computed 84 months after program start. E denotes employed and NE denotes 
non-employed (unemployed or out of labor force) in month 84. "Monthly earnings" are the monthly earnings in the 
last job prior to current unemployment. 
Concerning selection into the programs, the results can be summarized as follows: Partici-
pants in re-training are younger compared to other unemployed, which is line with the idea 
that human capital investments are more beneficial if the productive period of the new human 
capital is longer. Interestingly the share of foreigners in the programs is only about half the 
share of foreigners in the group of non-participants. Participants in practice firms and re-train-Lechner and Melly, 2007  8 
ing are less educated and less skilled. Past earnings are somewhat higher for participants in 
short and more strongly in long training than in practice firms and re-training. 
As expected, we observe a positive selection into employment: Employed individuals are 
better educated, younger, and received higher salaries during their last occupation than non-
employed individuals. Interestingly, they reside less frequently in a big city (reflecting the 
higher unemployment rates in German cities). Thus, there is a clear non-random selection into 
programs as well as into employment. Understanding and correcting for these two selection 
processes is the key to recover the 'pure' earnings effects of these training programs. 
3  Notation, definitions, and effects 
3.1  The standard model of potential outcomes 
To analyze the problem described in the previous section, it is necessary to introduce some 
notation. Each observation i in our large sample of size N is randomly drawn from a large 
population described by the joint distribution of the random variables (Y, S, D, X). The vari-
able Y and the binary variable S measure our outcomes of interest, namely earnings and em-
ployment. The binary variable D indicates participation in the training program. Individual 
characteristics are captured by X which is defined over a set  χ . We follow the convention 
that random variables are denoted by capital letters, whereas their realisations are denoted by 
small letters. Thus, the sample contains the data { } 1 , , ,
N
i i i i i y s d x
= . Note that for ease of exposi-
tion, we assume there is only one program (and one employment state). This convention also 
indicates that we are interested in comparing the different participation states with each other. 
Of course, in the application there are many such binary comparisons that are of interest (see 
Imbens, 2000, and Lechner, 2001, for a formal multiple treatment framework).  Lechner and Melly, 2007  9 
We follow the standard approach in the microeconometric literature to use potential outcomes 
to define causal effects of interest. This approach was popularized by Rubin (1974), among 
others. As usual, we define potential values for the employment variable, S(d), as well as for 
the earnings variable,  ( ) Y d , with respect to program participation. Since potential earnings 
have a different interpretation when an individual is working compared to not working, we 
consider potential earnings as depending on two (binary) events, namely participation in a 
program (d=1) and working (s=1), i.e.  ( , ) Y d s . Assuming the validity of the stable unit treat-
ment value assumption (see Rubin, 1980) allows us to relate the different potential outcomes 
to each other and to the observable outcomes:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,1) 1 ( ) ( ,0) Y d S d Y d S d Y d = + − ; 
( ) (1) 1 (0) S DS D S = + − ; 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
(1) 1 (0)
(1) (1,1) 1 (1) (1,0) 1 (0) (0,1) 1 (0) (0,0) .
Y DY D Y
D S Y S Y D S Y S Y
= + − =
= + − + − + −        
 
Following the literature, we base our analysis on causal parameters that can be deduced from 
the differences of the marginal distributions of potential outcomes.
7 First, consider average 
and quantile treatment effects on Y caused by D for a population defined by a specific treat-
ment status d. To define the quantile effects, let  ( ) ; V W F v w be the distribution function of V 
conditional on W evaluated at v and w. V and W may be vectors of random variables. The cor-
responding θ
th (0 1 θ ≤ ≤ ) quantile of  ( ) ; V W F v w  is denoted by  ( )
1 ; V W F w θ
− . Using this defini-
tion, we obtain the following earnings effects of participating in a program: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) (1) (0)
D ATE d E Y D d E Y D d = = − = ; 
1 1
(1) (0) ( ) ( ; ) ( ; )
D
Y D Y D QTE d F d F d θ θ θ
− − = − . 
For d=1, we obtain the so-called treatment effects on the treated, whereas for d=0 we obtain 
the treatment effects on the non-treated. The average effects unconditional on treatment status 
are thus a weighted average of those two effects. To minimize redundancies, we do not con-
sider the latter effects explicitly. 
These parameters defined for various outcome variables are the usual objects of investigation 
in empirical evaluation studies. However, depending whether individuals work (S=1) or not 
(S=0), Y measures very different objects. For working individuals, the data usually contains 
some earnings measure, whereas for non-working individuals it is either zero, or contains 
some non-wage income like unemployment or retirement benefits. In the former case, the 
causal effect would measure some productivity gain due to the program, whereas in the latter 
case we would estimate the impact of the program on a measure of disposable income. These 
parameters are interesting in their own right and are frequently estimated in empirical studies 
(e.g. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2005). However, they fail to answer the important ques-
tion whether the program would lead to earnings increases if employment had been found. 
The failure of answering this important policy question comes from the fact that the potential 
outcomes, Y(1) and Y(0), are not defined conditional on the employment state, and thus mix 
employment and earnings effects.  
Therefore, to answer questions about the potential earnings effects for individuals had they 
taken up a job after the program, we compare potential outcomes for different participation 
states in a (potential) world in which all individuals had found a job, which is not observable 
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for non-working individuals. In particular, we investigate the (pure) earnings effects for those 
individuals who found a job under the treatment: 
( ) ( )
,1( ,1) (1,1) , ( ) 1 (0,1)| , ( ) 1
D ATE d E Y D d S d E Y D d S d = = = − = = ;   
( ) ( )
,1 1 1
(1,1) , ( ) (0,1) , ( ) ( ,1) ; ,1 ; ,1
D
Y D S d Y D S d QTE d F d F d θ θ θ
− − = − .   
Since the problem is symmetric in d, we consider only the “doubly treated” population and 
concentrate on 
,1(1,1)
D ATE  and 
,1(1,1)
D QTEθ . By doing so, we also refrain from explicitly 
investigating, for example, effects on benefits receipts that would be captured by 
,0( ,1)
D ATE d  
and 
,0( ,1)
D QTE d . Again, the technical arguments would be almost identical. 
We  could  also  consider  the  treatment  effects  for  the  whole  population  (irrespectively  of 
whether individuals have found a job or not). However, such effects may be of less policy 
interest than the effects for the effectively treated population, particularly in the context of 
narrowly targeted programs.  
The effects for other populations have been considered in the literature as well. Recently 
Card, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2001) considered earnings effects for those workers who 
were induced to work by program participation. Similarly, Zhang and Rubin (2003) and Lee 
(2005) consider earnings effects for individuals who would work irrespective whether they 
participate in a program or not. Of course, both such populations are unobserved and, thus, 
difficult to describe. They cannot be characterized, for example, by simple descriptive statis-
tics. Furthermore, Card, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2001) and Lee (2005) severely restrict 
the heterogeneity of the treatment effect. While Card, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2001) as-
sume that the treatment effect on employment is positive for all observations, Lee (2005) as-
sumes that this treatment effect is either positive for everybody or negative for everybody. Lechner and Melly, 2007  12 
However, heterogeneous effects are a typical finding in program evaluation studies, as con-
firmed by our application.  
Note that all subpopulations considered so far are defined by variables whose values are not 
caused by the treatment (note that although S is caused by D, S(d) is by construction not 
caused by D). For example, if we consider effects conditional on S, the causal interpretation 
of such effects is unclear, because part of the effect of D on S, and thus on Y, is already 'taken 
away' by the conditioning variable S (see Lechner, 2008). Therefore, we will not consider the 
effect of D on those participants and nonparticipants who actually found a job. 
3.2  Unified notation for average and quantile effects 
In this paper, we consider explicitly the identification and estimation of average and quantile 
treatment effects. To do so, we introduce a notation that encompasses both types of effects to 
avoid redundancies in our formal arguments. 
Let  () g ⋅  be a function mapping Y into the real line. We will show below that we only need to 
consider  identification  of  ( ) ( , ) , ', ' E g Y d s X x D d S s  = = =      for  { } , ', , ' 0,1 d d s s ∈   and 
x χ ∈  to examine the identification of the average and quantile treatment effects. Letting 
( ) g Y Y = ,  we  obtain  all  ATEs  defined  above.  Letting  ( ) ( ) 1 g Y Y y = ≤ ɶ ,  we  identify  the 
distribution function of Y evaluated at  y ɶ .
8 The distribution function can then be inverted to 
get the quantiles of interest and to obtain all QTEs defined above. 
Define  inf ( ) g y K g y ≡  as lower bound of  ( ) g ⋅  and  sup ( ) g
y
K g y ≡  as its upper bound. These 
bounds may or may not be finite depending on  ( ) g ⋅  and the support of Y. If we estimate the 
distribution function,  ( ) g ⋅  is an indicator function, which is naturally bounded between 0 and 
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1. If we estimate the expected value of Y,  ( ) g ⋅  is the identity function and  Y K  and  Y K  are the 
bounds of the support of Y. If we estimate the variance of Y,  ( )
2
( ) ( ) g Y Y E Y = − . In this case, 
and in the absence of further information on  ( ) E Y , the lower bound on  () g ⋅  is 0 and the up-
per bound is  ( )
2
0.25 Y Y K K − .
9 
Lemma 1 shows that tight bounds on the conditional expectations can be integrated to get 
tight bounds unconditionally on X.
10 
Lemma 1 (bounds on the unconditional expected value of  () g ⋅ ) 
Let  ( ) g b x  and  ( ) g b x  be tight lower and upper bounds on  ( ) ( ) E g Y X x = . Then  ( ) ( ) g E b X  
and  ( ) ( ) g E b X  are tight lower and upper bounds on  ( ) ( ) E g Y . This result holds in the popula-
tion and all subpopulations defined by values of D and S.  
The proof of this lemma (as well as all other proofs) can be found in the Technical Appendix. 
Naturally, if  ( ) ( ) g g b x b x =  for  x χ ∀ ∈ , then  ( ) ( ) E g Y  is identified. Letting  () g ⋅  be the iden-
tity function, we obtain sharp bounds on the average treatment effect on the treated: 
( ) ( )




( 1, 1) ( ) 1, 1




E Y D S E b X D S
ATE E Y D S E b X D S
= = − = =
≤ ≤ = = − = =
 
Similarly, by letting  ( ) ( ) 1 g Y Y y = ≤ ɶ  and using the same principles, we obtain bounds on the 
unconditional distribution function. Lemma 2 shows how the bounds on the unconditional 
distribution function can be inverted to get bounds on the unconditional quantile function. 
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Lemma 2 (bounds on the quantile function) 
Let  ( ) Y r y ɶ  and  ( ) Y r y ɶ  be tight lower and upper bounds on the distribution function of Y evalu-
ated at  y ɶ . Let 0 1 θ < <  and define  ( ) QY r θ  and  ( ) QY r θ  as follows: 
{ } ( ) inf ( ) QY Y y r r y θ θ ≡ ≥
ɶ ɶ    if  lim ( ) Y y r y θ
→−∞ >
ɶ ɶ , 
  ≡ −∞                      otherwise; 
{ } ( ) sup ( ) QY Y
y
r r y θ θ ≡ ≤
ɶ
ɶ    if lim ( ) Y y r y θ
→∞ <
ɶ ɶ , 
  ≡ ∞        otherwise. 
The tight lower and upper bounds for the θ
th quantile of Y are  ( ) QY r θ  and  ( ) QY r θ .  
If Y has a bounded support, −∞ and ∞ are replaced by the bounds on that support. Note that 
the upper bound on the distribution function determines the lower bound on the quantiles (et 
vice versa). Furthermore, not that low quantiles are bounded by below and high quantile by 
above only if Y has a bounded support. The implication of Lemmas 1 and 2 is that we only 
need to determine tight bounds of the conditional expected value of  ( ) ( , ) g Y d s , in particular 
( ) (0,1) g Y , to bound sharply the ATEs and QTEs of interest. This is done in the next section. 
4  Identification 
4.1  First step assumptions 
To concentrate on the special problems coming from the 'double selection problem' into pro-
grams and employment, we assume that the data are rich enough to identify the distributions 
of the marginal potential outcomes, Y(d), for all values of the treatment. Here, to keep the 
notation tractable and because we use this assumption in the application, we assume inde-
pendence of treatment, D, and potential outcomes, Y(d), S(d), conditional on confounders, X, 
as in the standard matching literature. There are other ways to identify Y(d) and S(d), for ex-Lechner and Melly, 2007  15 
ample using a continuous instrument as in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). Our results con-
cerning the identification of the effects on potential earnings do not depend on the assumption 
used to identify Y(d).  
It will be notationally convenient for the derivation of the technical properties in the next sec-
tion to use a slightly stronger condition than required for the identification of the effect of D 
on S(0) and Y(0) alone. For the latter it would suffice that  (0) Y  [ (0,1) (1 ) (0,0) SY S Y = + − ] 
and S(0) are mutually independent of D conditional on X. Instead we assume that  (0,1) Y , 
(0,0) Y , S(1) and S(0) are jointly independent of D conditional on X. It terms of our applica-
tion, this additional restriction does not entail further substantive behavioral restrictions con-
cerning the assignment process to the training program. Furthermore, to be able to recover the 
necessary information from the data, common support assumptions are added in part b). Note 
that the second part of the common support assumption is, again, not necessary for the identi-
fication of the distributions of Y(0) and S(0). It is added to be used below when interest is in 
the identification of the distribution of Y(0,s). Finally, in part c) of Assumption 1 we add stan-
dard regularity conditions guaranteeing that the objects of interest exist.  
Assumption 1 (conditional independence assumption for first stage) 
a) Conditional independences: { } (0,0), (0,1), (0), (1) Y Y S S D X x ⊥ =  for   x χ ∀ ∈ ;
11 
b) Common support:   ( 1 ) 1 P D X x = = <      x χ ∀ ∈ ;  
      ( ) ( ) 1 0 P S d X x = = >  for   {0,1} and  d x χ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ;
 
c)  ( ) ( , ) , 1, E g Y d s X x D S s  = = =    is finite  for  , {0,1} and  s d x χ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ . 
                                                           
11  This  notation  means  that  the  joint  distribution  of  (0,0) Y ,  (0,1) Y ,  (0) S ,  and  (1) S   conditional  on  X  is 
independent of the distribution of D conditional on X. Conditional independence of the potential outcomes is 
sufficient for conditional independence for all functions  () g ⋅  of the potential outcomes. Weaker conditions 
are sufficient for important special cases. For instance, mean independence is sufficient for ATE. Lechner and Melly, 2007  16 
Lemma 3 states that these conditions are sufficient to identify the causal effects of D on 
earnings and employment outcomes.  
Lemma 3 (Assumption 1 identifies effects of D on S(d) and Y(d)) 
If Assumption 1 holds then  ( ) (1) (0) 1 E S S D − =  is identified. If  ( ) g Y Y = , then  (1)
D ATE  is 
identified. If  ( ) ( ) 1 g Y Y y = ≤ ɶ  for  y ∀ɶ  in the support of Y, then  (1)
D QTEθ  is identified for 
( ) 0,1 θ ∀ ∈ . 
Imbens (2004) provides an excellent survey of estimators for ATEs consistent under As-
sumption 1. Efficient estimation of such average treatment effects is discussed for example in 
Hahn (1998), Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998), Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003), and 
Imbens, Newey, and Ridder (2005). Firpo (2007) and Melly (2006) discuss efficient estima-
tion of quantile treatment effects. Note that by restricting X to be a constant we obtain the 
special case of a random experiment, which is analyzed by Lee (2005). 
4.2  Point identification of the effects on potential earnings 
The conditions necessary to identify the program effects on employment and on earnings, as 
discussed in the previous section, are not sufficient to identify the effects of D on the potential 
earnings given the employment status,  ( , ) Y d s . One possible set of restrictions that lead to 
point identification of distributions of these potential outcomes is given in Assumption 2: 
Assumption 2 (conditional independence of potential earnings) 
a) Conditional independence:  ( ,1) ( ') , ' Y d S d X x D d ⊥ = =  for  , ' {0,1} d d ∀ ∈  and  x χ ∀ ∈ ; 
b) Common support:    ( ) 0 (1 ) (0) 1 P D S X x < − = = , for  x χ ∀ ∈ . Lechner and Melly, 2007  17 
Condition a) states that selection into employment is independent from potential earnings. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to compare working participants to non-working participants with 
the same characteristics X. Of course, depending on how informative X is, this assumption 
may contradict standard economic models designed to analyze individual employment deci-
sions (e.g. Roy, 1951). Lemma 4 shows that Assumptions 1 and 2 are sufficient to identify the 
distribution of  ( ,1) Y d : 
Lemma 4 (Assumptions 1 and 2 identify treatment effects on potential earnings) 
If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied with  ( ) g Y Y = , then 
,1(1,1)
D ATE  is identified. If these 
assumptions  hold  with  ( ) ( ) 1 g Y Y y = ≤ ɶ   for  y ∀ɶ   in  the  support  of  Y,  then 
,1(1,1)
D QTEθ   is 
identified for  ( ) 0,1 θ ∀ ∈ , d=0,1. 
An alternative to identify the treatment effects on potential earnings is the presence of a con-
tinuous instrument for the participation decision S. The nonparametric identification of the 
resulting sample selection models is discussed in Das, Newey, and Vella (2003). It would be 
straightforward to use their results in our context. In our data set, as often in applications, 
there is no plausible continuous instrument. Discrete instruments (i.e. exclusion restrictions 
for discrete variables) do generally not allow identifying the above defined treatment effects. 
However, since they identify effects for some complier population, they do necessarily not 
lead to point identification of the causal effects defined above, but reduce the uncertainty 
about the true effects. Therefore, we discuss the case of discrete instruments further below. 
4.3  Worst case bounds 
Since Assumption 2 is not plausible in our and probably the majority of applications and no 
continuous instruments are available for the second stage selection process, we give up on try-
ing to achieve plausible point identification. Instead, we bound the treatment effects using Lechner and Melly, 2007  18 
weaker assumptions that appear to be more reasonable in our empirical study (and many other 
applications). 
Theorem 1 shows that knowing the effects of D on Y(d) and S(d) reduces the uncertainty. To 
state this theorem concisely, we denote the expected value of Y over its upper part of its dis-
tribution  up  to  p-%  largest  values  conditionally  on  X x =   by 
max ( )
p E Y X x = .  Similarly, 
min ( )
p E Y X x =  denotes the same expected value but over the p fraction of the lower part of the 
distribution of Y.
12 
Theorem 1 (worst-case bounds) 
Assumption 1 holds. If  , , ( ,0) ( ,1) 1 S X D S X D p x p x + > ,
13 then the lower and upper bounds on 
( ) (0,1) , 1, 1 E g Y X x D S  = = =     are given by 
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If  , , ( ,0) ( ,1) 1 S X D S X D p x p x + ≤ , then the bounds are  g K  and  g K . 
                                                           
12  This type of notation can also be found in Zhang and Rubin (2003). 
13  Generally, 
| ( ) V W p w  denotes the probability that all elements of the vector of binary variables V are jointly 
equal to one, conditional on W w = . Lechner and Melly, 2007  19 
Note that the bounds are observable. Theorem 1 shows that we can learn part of the nonpar-
ticipation-employment outcome of employed participants from the employment outcomes of 
non-participants. However, since Assumption 1 is silent about the selection of participants 
and non-participants into employment, there remains uncertainty coming from the employ-
ment outcomes of those who would not work if participating or who would not work if non-
participating. Clearly, without further assumptions nothing can be learned about the average 
counterfactual outcome of working from those who would not work either as participants or 
as non-participants. The importance of this uncertainty decreases as the probability of non-
working for participants and non-participants decreases. 
It is clear that these bounds will be very wide if the employment probabilities are not high. In 
our application, the employment probabilities are low because we consider a sample of per-
sons who are unemployed when treatment starts. The employment probability at the end of 
our sample period is never higher than 60%. Therefore, we cannot expect to obtain informa-
tive bounds without further restricting the selection process into employment. Such restric-
tions will be imposed below. 
4.4  Exclusion restrictions 
As already noted in Section 4.2, a continuous instrument for employment would allow identi-
fication of the effects of interest. Here, we analyze the more realistic case of discrete instru-
ments. Although such instruments reduce uncertainty, they do not identify the effects.  
Following Manski (1994, Section 3.1), we assume that Y is independent of Z given X: 
Assumption 3 (exclusion restriction) 
a) There is a random variable Z with support Ζ  such that: 
(0,1) , 1, 1 Y Z X x D S ⊥ = = = ,  x χ ∀ ∈ . 
b) Assumption 1 holds with Z included in the list of control variables X. Lechner and Melly, 2007  20 
Assumption 3-b) implies that the bounds derived in Theorem 1 are valid if we condition on X 
and Z. Assumption 3-a) implies that the bounds must be the same for all values of Z. Theorem 
2 formalizes these intuitions: 
Theorem 2 (exclusion restriction) 
Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. For the case  , , , , ( , ,0) ( , ,1) 1 S X Z D S X Z D p x z p x z + >  the lower and up-
per bounds are given by: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
, , , ,
, ,
, ,0 , ,1 1
min
, ,0
, , , , , ,
, , , ,
, ( ) , , 0, 1
( , ,0) ( , ,1) 1 1 ( , ,0)
( , ,1) ( , ,1)
S X Z D S X Z D
S X Z D
g Y p x z p x z
p x z
S X Z D S X Z D S X Z D
g
S X Z D S X Z D
b x z E g Y X x Z z D S
p x z p x z p x z
K
p x z p x z
+ −
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.
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If  , , , , ( , ,0) ( , ,1) 1 S X Z D S X Z D p x z p x z + ≤ , we get  ( )( , ) g g Y b x z K =  and  ( )( , ) g g Y b x z K = . The lower 




 and the upper bound 
by  ( ) inf ( , ) g Y z b x z
∈Ζ . 
4.5  Positive selection into employment  
In a standard labor supply models individuals accept a job offer if the offered wage is higher 
than same reservation wage, denoted by 
R Y , i.e.  ( ) (0) 1 (0,1)
R S Y Y = ≥ . This relation moti-
vates the assumption that the employment probability conditional on X should be smaller for 
smaller  potential  earnings  than  for  higher  potential  earnings.  Therefore,  we  get 
( ) ( ) Pr (0) 1 , (0,1) Pr (0) 1 , (0,1) S X x Y y S X x Y y = = ≤ ≤ = = > ɶ ɶ , if  (0,1) Y  and 
R Y  are not too Lechner and Melly, 2007  21 
strongly correlated (see Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir, 2007). Such a condition is 
equivalent to assuming that the distribution of  (0,1) Y  given  (0) 1 S =  stochastically dominates 
the distribution of  (0,1) Y  given  (0) 0 S =  and is stated formally as follows:
14 
Assumption 4 (positive selection into employment of nonparticipants) 
( ) ( ) 0,1 | , , (0) 0,1 | , , (0) ( ; ,0,0) ( ; ,0,1) Y X D S Y X D S F y x F y x ≥ ɶ ɶ . 
Note that the positive selection condition is only imposed on those individuals not participat-
ing in a program. Assumption 4 tightens the bounds derived in Theorem 1: 
Theorem 3 (positive selection into employment)
15 
a) If Assumptions 1 and 4 hold, and  ( ) g ⋅  is an monotone increasing function, then: 
( )
, max ( ,1)
(0,1) , 1, 1 ( ) , 0, 1
S X D p x
E g Y X x D S E g Y X x D S  = = =  ≤  = = =     . 
b) If Assumptions 1 and 4 hold and  ( ) g ⋅  is a monotone decreasing function, then: 
( )
, min ( ,1)
(0,1) , 1, 1 ( ) , 0, 1
S X D p x
E g Y X x D S E g Y X x D S  = = =  ≥  = = =     . 
Note that the positive selection assumptions tighten only one of the two bounds of the treat-
ment effects. 
4.6  Conditional uniformity of the treatment effect on employment 
Lee (2005) restricts the individual treatment effect on the employment probability to have the 
same sign for all of the population. He calls this a monotonicity assumption.
16 Although, Lee's 
assumption is similar to the monotonicity assumption of Imbens and Angrist (1994), they re-
                                                           
14  See Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) for a proof. 
15  If  () g ⋅  is not monotonic, Assumption 4 can be replaced by  ( ) (0,1) , 0, (1) 1, (0) 1 E g Y X x D S S  = = = =  ≥    
( ) (0,1) , 0, (1) 1, (0) 0 E g Y X x D S S  = = = =     for part a) or with a ≤ sign for part b). Lechner and Melly, 2007  22 
strict the effect of the instrument on the treatment status, while Lee restricts the effect of the 
treatment on sample selection. Since monotonicity may be considered a strange name for 
these assumptions (the effect on a binary variable is necessarily monotonous), we call this 
assumption uniformity.
17  
Lee's (2005) assumption appears to be overly restrictive for the type of application we con-
sider. For instance, it excludes the possibility that a training program has positive effects on 
long-term unemployed but negative effects on short-term unemployed. However, this type of 
heterogeneity is typically found in the literature. Thus, we impose the weaker assumption that 
the direction of the effect on employment is the same for all individuals with the same char-
acteristics X. This assumption is satisfied if the vector of characteristics is rich enough to 
capture the program effect heterogeneity on employment. 
A second difference with Lee (2005) is that we bound the effect for an observable population. 
Lee bounds the effect on earnings for the population who would work with or without the 
program. Therefore, if the program has a positive effect on employment, then he bounds the 
effects for the non-treated population, while if the program has a negative effect on employ-
ment, he bounds the effects on the treated. When the employment effect is heterogeneous with 
respect to X, the population for which the effect is estimated is a mixture of treated and non-
treated, which is unobservable and difficult to interpret, and thus of limited use as a policy 
parameter. 
The third difference with Lee (2005) is that we consider a broader range of identifying as-
sumptions for the first step of the selection process, thus making the approach applicable out-
side the setting of random experiments. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
16 The same assumption is also made by Zhang and Rubin (2003). Lechner and Melly, 2007  23 
The formal definition of uniformity is given in Assumption 5: 
Assumption 5 (conditional uniformity of the treatment effect on employment) 
For each x χ ∈ ,   either  a)  ( ) (1) (0)| , 0 1 P S S X x D ≥ = = = , 
      or  b)  ( ) (1) (0)| , 0 1 P S S X x D ≤ = = = . 
Theorem 4 shows that Assumption 5 allows tightening the bounds considerably: 
Theorem 4 (conditional uniformity of the treatment effect on employment) 
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Interestingly,  we  obtain  point  identification  if  (1)| (0)| ( ) ( ) S X S X p x p x =   (i.e.  , ( ,1) S X D p x   = 
, ( ,0) S X D p x ). The reason is that under the uniformity assumption, both treatment and control 
groups are comprised of individuals whose sample selection was unaffected by the assign-
ment to treatment, and therefore the two groups are comparable. Sample selection correction 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
17  These assumptions are fundamentally different from the monotone treatment response assumption of Manski 
(1997) and from the monotone instrumental variables assumption of Manski and Pepper (2000), because those 
authors assume certain functions to be monotone. Lechner and Melly, 2007  24 
procedures are similar in this respect because they condition on the participation probability. 
However, they require continuous exclusion restrictions to achieve nonparametric identifica-
tion. In the absence of such exclusion restrictions, there is only identification if the employ-
ment probabilities are, by chance, the same. 
Theorem 4-b) comprises the result of Proposition 4 in Lee (2005) as a special case. This result 
has the appealing feature that the bounds do not depend on the support of  ( ) g ⋅ . Thus, the 
bounds are finite even when the support of Y is infinite. Obviously, this is irrelevant for the 
distribution function or if the support of Y is naturally bounded. 
4.7  Combination of assumptions 
Combining Assumptions 3, 4, and 5 leads to tighter bounds. The exclusion restriction is par-
ticularly easy to combine with any other assumption. The lower (upper) bound is given by the 
maximum (minimum) of the lower (upper) bound evaluated at each value the instrument can 
take. Combined with the uniformity assumption, an exclusion restriction is powerful if there 
is a value of the instrument such that the employment probabilities are (almost) the same for 
the participants and the non-participants. As discussed in Angrist (1997), sample selection 
models are working this way. The difference is that a discrete exclusion restriction identifies 
intervals and not points, because we will generally not find a value of the instrument that at-
tains the equality exactly. 
Next, we examine the combination of the positive selection assumption and the conditional 
uniformity assumption. Adding positive selection as defined in Assumption 4 to the condi-
tional uniformity assumption tightens the lower bound on  ( ) (0,1) , 1, 1 E g Y X x D S  = = =   : Lechner and Melly, 2007  25 
Theorem 5 (positive selection into employment and uniformity) 
a) Assumptions 1, 4, and 5-a) hold. If  ( ) g ⋅  is an monotone increasing function, then, the up-
per bound given in Theorem 4-a) tightens to: 
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b) Assumptions 1, 4, and 5-a) hold. If  ( ) g ⋅  is a monotone decreasing function, then the lower 
bound given in Theorem 4-a) tightens to: 
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Theorem 5 has two limitations that we will remedy by changing slightly the formulation, but 
not the substance, of the positive selection assumption. First, the positive selection assump-
tion compares  ( ) 0,1 | , (0)( ; ,0) Y X S F y x ɶ  and  ( ) 0,1 | , (0)( ; ,1) Y X S F y x ɶ , but not  ( ) 0,1 | , (0), (1)( ; ,0,1) Y X S S F y x ɶ  and 
( ) 0,1 | , (0), (1)( ; ,1,1) Y X S S F y x ɶ .  Therefore,  it  is  possible  that  ( ) 0,1 | , (0), (1)( ; ,0,1) Y X S S F y x ɶ   dominates 
( ) 0,1 | , (0), (1)( ; ,1,1) Y X S S F y x ɶ ,  although  at  the  same  time  ( ) 0,1 | , (0)( ; ,1) Y X S F y x ɶ   dominates 
( ) 0,1 | , (0)( ; ,0) Y X S F y x ɶ . This implausible scenario is ruled out in Assumption 6: 
Assumption 6 (positive selection into employment conditionally on  (1) 1 S = ) 
( ) ( ) 0,1 | , (0), (1) 0,1 | , (0), (1) ( ; ,0,1) ( ; ,1,1) Y X S S Y X S S F y x F y x ≥ ɶ ɶ . 
Combining Assumption 6 with the conditional uniformity assumption leads to simple and 
intuitive bounds  Lechner and Melly, 2007  26 
Theorem 6 (positive selection into employment conditionally on  (1) 1 S =  and uniformity) 
a)  Assumptions  1,  5-a),  and  6  hold.  If  () g ⋅   is  a  monotone  increasing  function,  then: 
( ) ( ) , 0, 1 (0,1) , 1, 1 E g Y X x D S E g Y X x D S  = = =  ≥  = = =     . 
b)  Assumptions  1,  5-a),  and  6  hold.  If  () g ⋅   is  a  monotone  decreasing  function,  then: 
( ) ( ) , 0, 1 (0,1) , 1, 1 E g Y X x D S E g Y X x D S  = = =  ≤  = = =     . 
The intuition for this result is better understood with an example. Suppose that a program has 
a positive effect on employment. This means that the "quality" of the employed participants is 
lower than that of the employed non-participants.
18 If, despite this lower quality, the program 
effect on the observed earnings is positive, this must imply that the program has a positive 
effect on potential earnings for the treated. 
Note  that  neither  Theorem  5  nor  Theorem  6  allows  to  tighten  the  bounds  if 
( ) (1) (0)| 1 P S S X x ≤ = = . The intuition for this results is that in this case, all observations 
with  (1) 1 S =  also have  (0) 1 S = . Thus, the problem for identifying the counterfactual mean is 
not that we do not know the value for the population with  (0) 0 S =  (this is irrelevant for the 
estimation of the effects on the doubly treated population), but that we do not know which of 
the observations with  (0) 1 S =  have  (0) 1 S =  as well. To tighten the bounds in this particular 
case, we suggest Assumption 7: 
Assumption 7 (positive selection into employment for  (0,1) Y  with respect to  (1) S ) 
( ) ( ) 0,1 | , , (0), (1) 0,1 | , , (0), (1) ( ; ,0,1,0) ( ; ,0,1,1) Y X D S S Y X D S S F y x F y x ≥ ɶ ɶ . 
                                                           
18  The positive selection assumption implies that the higher the employment probability the lower the "quality" 
of the workers. Lechner and Melly, 2007  27 
Note that this assumption is conceptually different from Assumptions 4 and 6 because it re-
lates the control outcome to the treated employment status and is therefore more restrictive. 
Similar assumptions have been made by Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer (2002, 
especially footnote 20), Zhang and Rubin (2004, Assumption 2) and Angrist, Bettinger, and 
Kremer  (2006,  especially  proposition  1).  To  motivate  this  assumption,  suppose  that 
(1,1) (0,1) Y Y α = + , with  0 α ≥  and suppose further that unemployed individuals accept a job 
if their potential earnings exceeds a certain threshold,   :  ( ) ( ) 1 ( ,1) S d Y d   = ≥ , for  {0,1} d ∈ . 
This implies the following inequalities: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
(0,1) (0) 1, (1) 1 (0,1) (1) 1 (0,1) 1,1
(0,1) (1,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0) 1 .
E Y S S E Y S E Y Y
E Y Y E Y Y E Y S
 
  α  
= = = = = ≥ ≥
≥ ≥ − = ≥ = =
 
Since  ( ) (0,1) (0) 1 E Y S =   is  a  weighted  average  of  ( ) (0,1) (0) 1, (1) 1 E Y S S = =   and 
( ) (0,1) (0) 1, (1) 0 E Y S S = = ,  the  inequality  implies  that  Assumption  7a)  is  satisfied  for 
(0,1) Y . 
Theorem 7 (positive selection into employment with respect to  ( ) 1 S  and uniformity) 
a)  Assumptions  1,  5-b),  and  7  hold.  If  () g ⋅   is  a  monotone  increasing  function,  then: 
( ) ( ) , 0, 1 (0,1) , 1, 1 E g Y X x D S E g Y X x D S  = = =  ≤  = = =     . 
b)  Assumptions  1,  5-b),  and  7  hold.  If  ( ) g ⋅   is  a  monotone  decreasing  function,  then: 
( ) ( ) , 0, 1 (0,1) , 1, 1 E g Y X x D S E g Y X x D S  = = =  ≥  = = =     . 
The intuition for this result is the same than for the result of Theorem 6. Lechner and Melly, 2007  28 
5  Estimation 
This paper focuses on the identification issues as well as on the empirical study that motivated 
the methodological innovation. Naturally, we bridge the gap between the identification results 
and the empirical study by proposing some estimators as well. However, due to space con-
straints we keep this part of the paper brief. We start by proposing consistent, nonparametric 
estimators. However, the combination of the dimension of the control variables and the sam-
ple sizes in this application are such that a fully nonparametric estimation strategy would lead 
to very imprecise estimators. Therefore, in Section 5.2 we suggest to use a (parametric) pro-
pensity score to reduce the dimension of the estimation problem and so to gain precision. 
5.1  Nonparametric estimators 
Here, we provide consistent, nonparametric estimators for all elements appearing in the dif-
ferent bounds of Theorems 1 to 7. Since we are interested in average as well as quantile ef-
fects,  we  consider  two  special  cases  of  the  g-function,  namely  ( ) g Y Y =   and 
( ) ( ) 1 g Y Y y = ≤ ɶ . 
The conditional employment probabilities  , ( , ) S X D p x d  for  {0,1} d ∈  could be estimated non-
parametrically using Nadaraya-Watson or local linear regression. However, a local nonlinear 
estimator (Fan, Heckman, and Wand, 1995), like a local probit for instance, should be more 
suited for binary dependent variables.
19 
( ) 1 , 0, 1 E Y y X x D S  ≤ = = =    ɶ  could be estimated by a local probit as well. However, for 
the QTEs we need to estimate the conditional distribution function evaluated at a large num-
ber of  y ɶ , which is computationally very intensive.
20 Moreover, since we need to estimate the 
complete conditional distribution anyway, it is natural and faster to estimate the whole distri-
                                                           
19  Moreover, in Frölich (2006) the local parametric estimator appears to have better small sample properties. Lechner and Melly, 2007  29 
bution by using locally weighted quantile regressions (Chaudhuri, 1991). By exploiting the 
linear programming representation of the quantile regression problem, it is possible to esti-
mate all quantile regression coefficients efficiently (see Koenker, 2005, Section 6.3). The es-
timated conditional quantiles, though not necessarily monotonous in finite samples, may be 
inverted using the strategy proposed by Melly (2006) to get the estimated conditional distri-
bution function.  
The conditional expectations of earnings,  ( , 0, 1) E Y X x D S = = = , is estimated by a local 
linear least squares regression. 
The majority of the bounds for the mean contain conditional, asymmetrically trimmed means 
like 
max ( , 0, 1)
p E Y X x D S = = =   and 
min ( , 0, 1)
p E Y X x D S = = = .
21  Lee  (2005)  proposes  an 
estimator for the case with discrete X. We propose a new estimator allowing for discrete and 
continuous X. Koenker and Portnoy (1987) suggest an estimator based on linear quantile re-




ˆ ( ) ( ) J d θ β θ θ ∫ , where  ˆ( ) β θ  is the θ
th quantile regression coefficient vector. We apply 
their  estimator  with  a  particular  weight  function,  ( ) J θ ,  and  use  nonparametric  quantile 
regression.  We  estimate 
max ( , 0, 1)





x x d β θ θ
−∫   and 
min ( , 0, 1)




x x d β θ θ ∫  where  ˆ( , ) x β θ  is the  θ
th local linear quantile 
regression evaluated at x. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
20  This is particularly problematic, because we rely on bootstrap based inference. Lechner and Melly, 2007  30 
Lemma 1 shows that the bounds of the unconditional expected values equal the expected val-
ues of the conditional bounds. Thus, we estimate the bounds on the ATE by the mean of the 
conditional bounds evaluated at the treated observations. Similarly, for the QTE, we estimate 
the unconditional distribution by integrating the bounds on the conditional distribution. These 
bounds, which are monotone, are inverted to obtain the bounds of the QTE as shown in 
Lemma 2. 
5.2  Using the propensity score to reduce the dimensionality of the problem 
In our application, the number of control variables X necessary to make Assumption 1 plausi-
ble is too high to attempt a fully nonparametric estimation strategy, even with very large sam-
ples. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that the propensity score represents a useful dimen-
sion reduction device, because conditional independence of assignment and treatment (As-
sumption 1a) holds conditional on the (one-dimensional) propensity score as well: 
{ } { } (0,0), (0,1), (0), (1)     (0,0), (0,1), (0), (1) ( ) D X Y Y S S D X x Y Y S S D p x ⊥ = ⇒ ⊥ . 
We estimate the propensity scores (for each program compared to nonparticipation) with pa-
rametric binary probits.
22 In a second step, we estimate the response functions and bounds 
nonparametrically conditional on the propensity score, allowing for arbitrary effect heteroge-
neity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
21  For the distribution function,  ( ) ( )
max 1 , 0, 1 1
p E Y y X x D S ≤ = = = = ɶ  if  ( ) ( ) 1 1 , 0, 1 p E Y y X x D S − < ≤ = = = ɶ  
and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
max 1 , 0, 1 1 1 , 0, 1
p E Y y X x D S E Y y X x D S p   ≤ = = = = − ≤ = = =   ɶ ɶ  otherwise, such that we do 
not need to estimate a trimmed mean. A similar result holds for the lower bound. 
22  Drake (1993) and Zhao (2005) find that estimators based on misspecified propensity scores were only slightly 
biased and much less biased than estimators based on incorrect response models. Lechner and Melly, 2007  31 
Similarly, if Assumption 4, 6, and 7 (positive selection into employment) are valid condition-
ally on X, they are also valid conditionally on the propensity score. In fact, these assumptions 
are less restrictive conditional on the propensity score, as the score is less fine than X. 
In  contrast,  conditioning  only  on  the  propensity  score  instead  of  X  would  considerably 
strengthen Assumption 5 (uniformity). The uniformity assumption states that the sign of the 
program effect on employment is the same for all observations with the same value of X. 
Therefore, the conditioning set must capture the heterogeneity of the employment effects. 
Since the conditioning set must also satisfy Assumption 1, we condition on the propensity 
score as well as on variables suspected to be related to employment effect heterogeneity. 
6  The earnings effects of training programs in West Germany 
6.1  Validity of the identifying assumptions 
As  explained  in  Section  2,  we  use  the  same  data  and  variables  as  Lechner,  Miquel,  and 
Wunsch  (2005).  They  discuss  extensively  why  Assumption  1  is  plausible  in  this  setting. 
Briefly, their argument is that the data, which was specifically compiled to evaluate these 
programs, contains the major variables that jointly influence (marginal) outcomes and partici-
pation in the different training programs. For example, we control for education, age, family 
status,  detailed  regional  differences,  as  well  as  previous  employment  histories  including 
earnings, and position in job, specific occupation, and industry. Some potentially important 
factors are still missing such as ability, motivation, and jail and detailed health histories, but 
we are confident to capture indirectly these factors with almost 20 years of employment histo-
ries and the other covariates. 
Assumptions 4, 6, and 7 (positive selection into employment) could be violated by a strong 
enough positive relationship between actual earnings and reservation earnings. This could be 
particularly the case for women, if high earnings women are matched with high earnings men, Lechner and Melly, 2007  32 
or for older unemployed with high productivity, if they have saved enough to retire. Figure 1 
uses the panel structure of our data to show that such effects may not be important. Following 
Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) we estimate cross sectional earnings equa-
tions for each month during the 6
th and 7
th year after program start. We then split the sample 
into those who were employed during the whole period and those who were not employed at 
least one month. Figure 1 shows that the residuals distribution of those always employed lies 
 



























































































































With spells out of labor market
 
 Lechner and Melly, 2007  33 
below the distribution of those sometimes unemployed. Although this is not a true test of the, 
formally untestable, positive selection assumption, it does provide some credibility for this as-
sumption. 
The uniformity assumption will be satisfied if we capture the heterogeneity of the treatment 
effects on employment. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005) find four variables related sig-
nificantly to the heterogeneity of the employment effects for at least one of the four programs: 
the regional unemployment rate, residence in big towns, sex, and long-term unemployment 
before the program. Therefore, we control for these four variables in addition to the propen-
sity score. 
6.2  Implementation of the estimation and inference procedures 
We use the estimators presented in Section 5 with the propensity scores based on binary pro-
bits.
23 All bandwidths necessary to implement the nonparametric regressions are chosen by 
cross-validation. The bandwidths depend on the program, the dependent variable (employ-
ment or earnings) and on the number of regressors. The same bandwidths are used for mean 
and quantile regressions. 
For most cases average treatment effects are unbounded if the support of earnings is un-
bounded. Here the support is naturally bounded: Due to the regulations of the social security 
system, from which database results, earnings are top-coded. This ceiling is however high, 
particularly for the low-earnings population we consider. It is attained by less than 1% of the 
observations in our sample. Thus, it is used as an upper bound together with zero as the lower 
bound. 
                                                           
23  Lechner,  Miquel,  and  Wunsch  (2005)  use  a  multinomial  probit.  We  use  binomial  probits  to  reduce  the 
computation  time.  Furthermore,  the  correlations  between  the  estimated  probabilities  resulting  from  both 
estimators are higher than 98%. Lechner and Melly, 2007  34 
We estimate the variance of the estimators by the standard nonparametric bootstrap. The heu-
ristic motivation for the bootstrap is the following: First, note that the bounds implied by the 
exclusion restriction involve maximum and minimum operators. Thus, it is not clear whether 
the bootstrap is consistent (e.g., see Horowitz, 2001). However, in the application there are no 
plausible exclusion restrictions. Therefore, this potential problem is not an issue. 
The other conditional bounds are free from any discontinuity and the estimators for them are 
continuous functions of estimators for which the regularity conditions of the bootstrap hold. 
The bounds for the treatment effects are estimated by integrating over the conditional bounds 
that are estimated by local linear methods. This is very similar to the estimator suggested by 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) for the average treatment effect, for which the bootstrap 
is known to be consistent. 
6.3  Standard earnings and employment effects 
We investigate the long-run effects of the training programs on earnings (and employment) by 
estimating the effects on annual earnings in the seventh year after program start. Before pre-
senting the results for the potential earnings, we show standard employment and earnings ef-
fects as benchmark. The upper panel of Table 3 presents the means of the outcome variables 
for the non-participants and the participants to the four programs considered. Of course, the 
differences between these means have no causal interpretation because they are computed for 
different population. Therefore, Table 3 presents also the estimated ATET. They are similar to 
the results of Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005) but are not exactly identical, because we 
use local linear regression estimators and they used a matching estimator, and because they 
consider monthly instead of yearly outcome variables. 
The results for employment show that all programs have a positive effect on employment. The 
effects on total earnings are positive for all programs, but it is impossible to know whether Lechner and Melly, 2007  35 
they are only driven by the effects on employment or whether they reflect an improved earn-
ings capacity. The estimated effects on earnings for the sub-samples of employed individuals 
are only valid if employment and earnings are independent. This assumption is probably not 
satisfied and these results are, therefore, difficult to interpret. 






training  Long training  Re-training 
Mean:           
Employment  0.45  0.58  0.63  0.62  0.73 
Earnings  8619  10429  13601  15745  15920 
Earnings given 
employment  19272  17897  21738  25254  21743 
ATET on:           
  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.14 
Employment 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
  1234  3117  3597  4816 
Earnings 
  (877)  (690)  (1122)  (849) 
  -325  2031  2926  2972  Earnings given 
employment    (1098)  (708)  (1113)  (763) 
Note:   The employment indicator is one if an individual worked at least one month in year 7. Earnings are defined as 
gross yearly earnings in year 7. Earnings for non-employed are coded as zero. Effects for "earnings given em-
ployment" are estimated on the subsamples of individuals with non-zero earnings. Bold numbers indicate signifi-
cance at the 5% level. 
The quantile treatment effects on earnings, that are new, are presented in Figure 2.
 24 They are 
even more difficult to interpret than the ATET. A substantial proportion of individuals are 
still unemployed whether they participated in a training program or not. Therefore, quantile 
treatment effects are zero for the lower part of the distribution. After that, participants are em-
                                                           
24  Since the sample objective function defining quantiles is non-differentiable, some bounds may slightly jump 
from one quantile to the other. Therefore, we use bagging (bootstrap aggregating) to smooth the results by 
defining the estimator of the bound to be the mean of the estimates obtained in 200 bootstrap samples. Lee 
and Yang (2006) and Knight and Bassett (2002) provide justification for bagging quantile regressions. Lechner and Melly, 2007  36 
ployed and the non-participants are unemployed. Consequently, the quantile treatment effects 
increase strongly but this is a pure employment effect. Finally, the quantile treatment effects 
stabilize when both participants and non-participants are employed in the upper part of the 
distribution. Furthermore, Figure 2 also shows the effects conditionally on being employed, 
but they are probably biased because of the sample selection issue that is the key topic of this 
paper. 
























Effects on total earnings













































































Note:   See note below Table 2. The standard errors, not plotted to avoid overloading the figure,  amount to about 1200 such 
that most of the positive quantile treatment effects on total earnings are significant. The quantile treatment effects 
conditional on employment are mainly significantly different from zero for short, long and re-training. Lechner and Melly, 2007  37 
To conclude, it is obvious that such results usually estimated and reported in evaluation stud-
ies are unable to reveal the effects of the training programs on the earnings capacity of the 
unemployed. Next, we present the results that are informative on that issue. 
6.4  Bounds on the potential earnings effects 
Table 4 shows the bounds for the ATETs and the QTETs. For the latter we present three se-
lected quantiles (0.25, 0.5, and 0.75). As discussed in Imbens and Manski (2004), for infer-
ence we may be interested in estimating confidence intervals that cover the entire identified 
interval with fixed probability or in confidence intervals that cover the true value of the pa-
rameter with a fixed probability. Since we are ultimately interested in the treatment effects 
and not in the bounds, the second type of confidence interval appears to be more appropriate, 
while the first one is more conservative. Therefore, Table 4 shows both types of confidence 
intervals, but the conclusions from the empirical results are robust to the type of confidence 
interval used. 
For all programs and all treatment effects, the worst-case bounds are extremely wide. Impos-
ing positive selection increases significantly the lower bounds but, with possibly one excep-
tion, is not sufficient to exclude zero effects. The uniformity assumption allows tightening 
upper and lower bounds compared to the worst-case bounds, but it is not powerful enough to 
reject the absence of earnings effect. However, the combination of positive selection with 
uniformity leads to informative bounds. We present the results for the three different defini-
tions of positive selection as discussed in Section 4. Note that the definition based on Theo-
rem 7 is more restrictive than the other two versions, because it relates potential outcomes for 
different treatment. Moreover, in our case the gain from imposing this assumption is small, 
because the employment effects of the programs are positive for the majority of the individu-
als. Therefore, our preferred bounds are those implied by Theorem 6 that are now discussed in 
more detail. Lechner and Melly, 2007  38 
Table 4: Bounds on the ATETs and QTETs of the programs practice firms and short training 
  ATET  QTET(0.25)  QTET(0.5)  QTET(0.75) 
  Lower       Upper 
bound 
Lower       Upper 
bound 
Lower       Upper 
bound 
Lower       Upper 
bound 
Practice firms 
-32086  17521  -43333  10067  -34581  18819  -27446  25954 
[-35042  19552]  [-47466  13303]  [-37736  21974]  [-29890  28420]  Worst case 
[-34567  19226]  [-46801  12783]  [-37229  21467]  [-29497  28024] 
-7543  17521  -10813  10067  -6741  18819  -4646  25954 
[-9961  19552]  [-14607  13303]  [-10257  21974]  [-7584  28420] 
Positive 
selection into 
employment  [-9572  19226]  [-13997  12783]  [-9692  21467]  [-7112  28024] 
-7719  3215  -2413  7187  -4221  4659  -12206  1594 
[-11053  5647]  [-6341  11647]  [-8229  8925]  [-27080  4732]  Uniformity 
[-10517  5256]  [-5710  10930]  [-7585  8239]  [-24708  4232] 
-2847  3215  -2293  7187  -2781  4659  -3566  1594 
[-5085  5647]  [-6066  11647]  [-6371  8925]  [-6518  4732] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 5)  [-4725  5256]  [-5460  10930]  [-5794  8239]  [-6043  4228] 
-718  3215  107  7187  -381  4659  -1166  1594 
[-2995  5647]  [-3605  11647]  [-3984  8925]  [-4123  4732] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 6)  [-2629  5256]  [-3008  10930]  [-3405  8240]  [-3653  4233] 
-718  3019  [107  7067  -381  4419  -1166  1234 
[-2995  5550]  [-3605  11630]  [-3984  8803]  [-4123  4396] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 7)  [-2629  5143]  [-3008  10896]  [-3406  8099]  [-3660  3901] 
Short training 
-25846  19657  -38436  14364  -30869  22531  -23657  28663 
[-28142  21313]  [-48587  15879]  [-32824  24487]  [-25239  31785]  Worst case 
[-27773  21046]  [-46955  15636]  [-32510  24172]  [-24985  31283] 
-4997  19657  -6516  14364  -3389  22531  -2297  28663 
[-6672  21313]  [-8473  15879]  [-5544  24487]  [-4334  31785] 
Positive 
selection into 
employment  [-6402  21046]  [-8158  15636]  [-5197  24172]  [-4007  31283] 
-5784  6840  1164  12924  -2309  8851  -21737  4303 
[-8218  8531]  [-908  15706]  [-4893  11764]  [-31066  6128]  Uniformity 
[-7827  8259]  [-575  15259]  [-4478  11296]  [-29566  5835] 
-703  6840  1164  12924  -389  8851  -977  4303 
[-2138  8531]  [-696  15706]  [-2311  11764]  [-2849  6128] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 5)  [-1907  8259]  [-397  15259]  [-2002  11296]  [-2548  5835] 
1863  6840  3684  12924  2611  8851  1543  4303 
[431  8531]  [1978  15706]  [666  11764]  [-131  6128] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 6)  [661  8259]  [2253  15259]  [979  11296]  [138  5835] 
1863  6794  3684  12924  2611  8731  1543  4303 
[431  8603]  [1978  15742]  [666  11762]  [-131  6198] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 7)  [661  8312]  [2253  15289]  [979  11275]  [138  5893] 
Table 4 to be continued … Lechner and Melly, 2007  39 
Table 4 continued …  
  ATET  QTET(0.25)  QTET(0.5)  QTET(0.75) 
  Lower       Upper 
bound 
Lower       Upper 
bound 
Lower       Upper 
bound  
Lower       Upper 
bound  
Long training 
-23200  21508  -33874  13646  -28845  24555  -20324  29596 
[-26091  24017]  [-44901  16741]  [-30879  26588]  [-24530  35699]  Worst case 
[-25626  23614]  [-43128  16244]  [-30552  26261]  [-23854  34718] 
-4243  21508  -7954  13646  -3045  24555  -2684  29596 
[-6723  24017]  [-11575  16741]  [-5577  26588]  [-7082  35699] 
Positive 
selection into 
employment  [-6324  23614]  [-10993  16244]  [-5170  26261]  [-6375  34718] 
-3323  7953  86  10886  -765  9315  -14804  6076 
[-6695  10503]  [-3495  15710]  [-4435  12605]  [-25814  10545]  Uniformity 
[-6153  10094]  [-2920  14934]  [-3845  12076]  [-24044  9827] 
863  7953  566  10886  795  9315  -284  6076 
[-1538  10503]  [-2993  15710]  [-1750  12605]  [-4762  10545] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 5)  [-1152  10094]  [-2421  14934]  [-1341  12076]  [-4043  9827] 
3389  7953  2846  10886  3795  9315  2956  6076 
[986  10503]  [-644  15710]  [1294  12605]  [-1389  10545] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 6)  [1372  10094]  [-83  14934]  [1696  12076]  [-718  9854] 
3389  7872  2846  10886  3795  9315  2956  5956 
[986  10594]  [-644  15808]  [1294  12821]  [-1389  10398] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 7)  [1372  10157]  [-83  15017]  [1696  12257]  [-722  9716] 
Re-training 
-18861  16473  -14430  11730  -30505  22895  -23210  19870 
[-21649  18293]  [-18198  14028]  [-34853  24671]  [-24570  23196]  Worst case 
[-21201  18000]  [-17593  13659]  [34154  24385]  [-24351  22661] 
-1650  16473  -5070  11730  335  22895  1390  19870 
[-3460  18293]  [-8016  14028]  [-1770  24671]  [-215  23196] 
Positive 
selection into 
employment  [-3169  18000]  [-7542  13659]  [-1432  24385]  [43  22661] 
-5161  7221  -1350  10170  -505  9215  -12770  6430 
[-7814  9085]  [-4299  13377]  [-3172  12318]  [-26071  8371]  Uniformity 
[-7387  8786]  [-3825  12861]  [-2744  11819]  [-23933  8059] 
783  7221  -990  10170  1655  9215  1870  6430 
[-934  9085]  [-3782  13377]  [-449  12318]  [94  8371] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 5)  [-658  8786]  [-3333  12861]  [-111  11819]  [379  8059] 
2744  7221  1410  10170  3695  9215  3430  6430 
[1069  9085]  [-1318  13377]  [1549  12318]  [1567  8371] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 6)  [1339  8786]  [-880  12861]  [1894  11819]  [1866  8059] 
2744  7049  1410  10170  3695  8855  3430  6070 
[1069  9051]  [-1318  13453]  [1549  12119]  [1567  8143] 
P.S. and 
uniformity 
(Theorem 7)  [1339  8729]  [-880  12925]  [1894  11594]  [1866  7810] 
Note:   The second line in each cell gives a 95%-confidence interval for the bounds estimated by bootstrapping the results 
200 times. The third line in each cell gives a 95%-confidence interval for the treatment effects obtained by the 
method of Imbens and Manski (2004) and by bootstrapping the results 200 times. P.S. means positive selection 
into employment. Intervals in bold significantly exclude a zero effect at the 5% level. See also note below Table 3. Lechner and Melly, 2007  40 
For practice firms, none of the bounds can significantly exclude zero effects. For all other 
programs, significant positive effects are found for the average effects and most quantile ef-
fects. The magnitudes of the effects are not small compared to median observed earnings of 
about 19’000 Euros. For instance, the lower bound on the median effect for re-training and 
long training is about 3’700 Euros, which is almost 20% of the median observed earnings. 
The average effects are somewhat smaller but still sizeable. All these results indicate that par-
ticipating in one of the three training programs significantly increases the earnings capacity of 
the participants. 
While Table 4 shows the results for three selected quantiles only, Figures 3 and 4 give a more 
complete picture of the quantile treatment effects by considering 99 percentiles. Figures 3 
presents the bounds for our preferred combination of assumptions (Theorem 6) along the with 
confidence intervals covering the true parameters with 95% probability (Imbens and Manski, 
2004). To get an impression about the identifying power of the other assumptions that have 
potential power to exclude zero effects in this application, Figure 4 shows the bounds result-
ing from the combination of the uniformity assumption with the three types of positive selec-
tion. To avoid overloading this figure we do not present confidence intervals. 
Figure 3 shows that short training has a significantly positive effect on earnings capacity from 
the 10
th to the 65
th percentile, long training from the 30
th to the 60
th percentile and re-training 
from the 35
th to the 85
th percentile, while no such effects appear for practice firms. It seems 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects are the same for all quantiles. Note 
however that these are effects in absolute value (in Euros) and the same absolute effect repre-
sents a much higher relative effect for low quantiles than for high quantiles. A statistically 
valid test of this hypothesis requires developing new test procedures based on the entire par-
tially identified quantile process. This is outside the scope of this paper. Lechner and Melly, 2007  41 


























































































































Note:   "Bagged" results obtained by taking the mean of the estimates over 200 bootstrap replications. Solid lines give the 
estimated bounds, dashed lines give the 95% confidence intervals, grey lines give the 0 line. The 95% confidence 
intervals are obtained by implementing Imbens and Manski (2004) results with a bootstrap based on 200 replica-
tions. 
Figure 4 compares the power of the different combinations of positive selection with uniform-
ity. It shows that the lower bound implied by Theorem 5 allows rejecting the absence of any 
effects only for re-training. The more informative lower bounds of Theorem 6 are needed to 
obtain significantly positive effects for short and long training. Lechner and Melly, 2007  42 
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Note:   "Bagged" results obtained by taking the mean of the estimates over 200 bootstrap replications. 
7  Conclusion 
Using our preferred combination of assumptions, we find substantial increases in the earnings 
capacity for three of the four groups of German training programs we consider. Although the 
assumptions used to obtain these results are rather weak and do not allow point identification 
of the effect, the effects are large enough and the assumptions powerful enough to reject the 
hypotheses that the average program effects and most quantile program effects on potential Lechner and Melly, 2007  43 
earnings are zero. This adds further evidence to previous findings suggesting that the West 
German training programs as run in the years after unification are a success (e.g., Fitzenber-
ger, Osikominu, and Völter, 2007, and Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2005) in sharp contrast 
to the programs run a decade later (see Wunsch and Lechner, 2007). From a methodological 
point of view, these results indicate that our bounding strategy is not only credible because it 
makes weak assumptions, but the strategy can be very informative for policy makers as well. 
The methods introduced in this paper are specific neither to problem of selection into em-
ployment nor to program evaluation. A first new potential application for the bounds we have 
obtained is the problem of sample attrition in panel econometrics. Evaluating the effects of a 
drug on an outcome different from the survival probability, quality of life for instance, repre-
sents a second example. Death will truncate the observed distribution of the life quality indi-
cator. Moreover, we cannot assume that death and life quality are independent. A third exam-
ple is given by the effects of an educational program on exam grades. Some of the students 
will probably not write the exam and these are probably less good than the students taking the 
exam. 
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